Burleson supported. As Lipsner describes it, "And that is how I happened to be in the delivery room when the airmail was born" (Lipsner, 1951, pp. 65, 66) .
In contrast to that, Otto Praeger claimed in a 1938 radio interview that Ruben Fleet was in charge. In responding to a question regarding early airmail, Otto Praeger said, ". . . the United States Army stepped into the picture with the suggestion that air mail flying would fit in excellently with its training program and it offered to operate the service without cost to the Post Office Department during the period of the war" (Bomar, 1938, p. 2) . Regarding Fleet's appointment, Praeger stated that "a Major of the Air Service, young, unusually capable, and full of pep" (Bomar, 1938, p 2.) (Bomar, 1938, p. 2) .
The First Airmail Flight
Whether it was Lipsner or Fleet, the record is not clear. What is clear however is that they were both there and each tells a different story about an incident in which the airplane that would launch the airmail service, an Army JN-4 Jenny, failed to start because it was out of gas. Ruben different ideas of direction but said I was 35 or 40 miles South West of Washington.
Unable to rely on this information and not confident of compass, I took off and landed near Waldorf MD. Purpose was to ascertain from Post Office my real position. Landed in good looking large field. Field was soft however and machine nosed over after having made good landing, slightly tail low. Propeller and [blank] were broken. Otherwise ship O.K. . . . (Boyle, 1918) .
Copies of the front and back of Boyle's flight record are shown next. 1 Notice that in Boyle's written narrative (back of flight record) there is a blank space between 'and' and 'were' in the fifth line from the bottom. Perhaps a word or words were 1 This document is an extremely important part of aviation history because it is the single document that marks the beginning of the airline industry of the U.S. Given that the airline industry grew from the delivery of mail by air, this flight record is that of the first airmail flight of scheduled air mail delivery in the continental U.S.
originally there but were later erased. The sentence reads "Propeller and [blank] were broken" (Boyle, 1918) . Since the rest of his description has subject and verb agreement and this sentence has a plural verb, one is led to believe that something else besides the propeller was broken. This seems to lend some credence to the report by the Washington Post.
The Post Office gave Boyle another chance on a different day and he got lost again, crash landed and broke a wing on the plane. The Post Office wanted to give him a third chance but Reuben Fleet put his foot down and sent Boyle back to flight school to get some more practice in cross-country flights (Wagner, p. 56) .
One would have to ask why a Second Lieutenant fresh out of flight school would be chosen for such an important and historic flight, one with the President of the United States in attendance. The answer is political motivation. Boyle's father-in-law-to-be was an important figure on the Washington scene. He was a judge and an Interstate Commerce Commissioner whose influence with Post Office officials provided the opportunity for Boyle (Wagner, p. 54) .
Post Office Operation
The shaky start of airmail and the murky organizational structure of the new Air Mail service between the Post Office and the Army were short lived. In August of 1918, the Post Office severed its relationship with the Army and took over its own operation using its own airplanes and pilots (Brown, 1980, p. 91) . Not long after this, the war in Europe was over and there was a glut of pilots, mechanics and airplanes.
The airmail service chose as its primary airmail aircraft the war surplus De Havilland DH-4, designed in England and built in the U.S. The airplane was powered by a "400 h.p. American Liberty engine, a V-12 which was created by Detroit's engineering team to an air corps specification during the war. The more powerful engine enabled the DH-4s to clear the mountains" (Retell True Story, 1968 Flaming Coffins" (p. 188) . This was due, in part, to a weak landing gear and the design of the airplane which had the fuel tank forward, behind the engine, followed by two tandem seats. In a hard landing, the gear would collapse forcing the pilot forward close to a fuel tank that may have been ruptured by the crash. The ignition source was the hot engine exposing the pilot to burning fuel, thus the name flaming coffin.
When the Air Mail Service began flying the DH-4, the mail was placed in the back seat of the tandem seated aircraft and the fuel tank was located forward of the front seat. In a nosefirst crash the pilot was sandwiched between the mail and the fuel. The Air Mail service modified the aircraft by strengthening the landing gear, moving the pilot to the aft cockpit, and placing the mail in the front cockpit; these changes made the DH-4 a much safer machine, although it was a challenge to fly from the back seat (Brady, p. 129) .
In a March 25, 1920, Post Office document, the statistics covering eight months of flying the air mail include a column titled Trips Started followed by another column entitled Trips Completed Without Forced Landings (Post Office Department, p. 3). The very necessity for the second column almost tells the story.
At that time there were twenty air mail pilots. Over the eight month period beginning in August 1919 and ending in March 1920, those twenty pilots experienced more than 200 forced landings. Those pilots had a one in five chance of having to execute a forced landing each time they flew. For the 200 plus forced landings in the reported eight month period, 23% were attributed to mechanical problems and 77% were due to weather (Post Office Department, p. Even with the associated hazards, at least flying the mail for the U.S. government was a flying job, one of the few available. Ironically, there were plenty of airplanes available and they were cheap. Many ex-military flyers bought war surplus Jennys and took to the road barnstorming from town to town. When a reporter asked a barnstormer what the most dangerous thing about flying was, the pilot replied, "The risk of starving to death" (Komons, 1989, p. 12.) .
The Night Flight Experiment
By late 1920, the airmail pilots were flying the mail coast to coast, but only during the day. At night the mail was put onto trains until the following morning at which time it would be transferred to an airplane and the journey continued. Otto Praeger had plans to request funds from Congress to light the airways and several airports but a new administration had been elected, the Harding administration, and they were not an aviation-minded group. In those days, the new administration took office in March rather than in January as they do now. This meant that February, one of the worst weather months in the U.S., was chosen for the demonstration.
As a last-gasp effort to save civil aeronautics, the postal authorities under harddriving Assistant Postmaster general Otto Praeger, and the volunteer flying postmen had decided to fly the mail for one night without beacons or landing lights or navigational aids other than bonfires. They picked Washington's Birthday, at the tag end of winter, as the last possible moment to arouse popular enthusiasm and spur the outgoing Congress to action (Taylor, 1962, p. 3).
The plan was to launch two DH-4 aircraft from the east and head them west, pony express style, while at the same time launch two from the west and head them east. The two from the east immediately ran into trouble with the northeast winter weather and could get no further than Chicago. The following is the Post Office's official report of the westbound flights that began (White, 1921 On the other side of the continent, two airplanes headed east; this official account shows the activity of the first eastbound flight 2 (White, 1921, pp. 3, 4) : This rather droll and factual account did not reflect the excitement being broadcast across the country about this brave airmail pilot, Jack "Skinny" Knight, fighting the winter weather, flying routes he had never flown, and pressing on into the night to get the mail through. When word of his expected arrival time in Chicago was broadcast over the radio, the speakeasies emptied out to greet the arriving hero. So partly by design and mostly by accident,
Otto Praeger had his event. Even the incoming President Harding was convinced:
Prodded by President Harding a month after he took office, Congress got busy on laws authorizing Federal regulation of civil aviation and appropriated $1,250,000 for continuing and expanding airmail service and lighting the airways (Taylor, 1962, p. 5 ).
The Accident
But there was an overlooked event that occurred during this demonstration that demands further explanation. Lewis' angle of bank was too steep and his approach speed too low for the thin air at the 4,000-foot altitude of the field. Even as the crowd watched, appalled into silence, the plane lost lift and plummeted to earth (p. 75).
Brady (2000) describes it this way, "As Nutter was landing at Reno, he spotted Lewis behind him descending for a landing. Lewis rolled into a turn then lost control. The crash destroyed the airplane and killed Lewis" (p. 132).
Both of these reports were incorrect as to location, flight phase, and most other assertions. Here is the official report of the circumstances for eastbound flight No. 2 (White, 1921, p. The mail was transferred to ship No. 67 and Lewis took off at 9:38. After going about 500 feet alt., on a straightaway climb, he attempted a flat turn and fell into a spin.
The pilot was killed.
It is abundantly clear that the pilot Lewis was killed at Elko, not Reno, and the accident occurred on climb out after takeoff, not on landing. Even the supposed eyewitness, airmail pilot Nutter, was not at Elko when the accident occurred; he was in Reno, having completed his part of the mission.
One should have been able to discern these facts from the accident investigation Here is Otto Praeger's response A. Captain Lewis took off in ship 67, which is one of the mail ships at approximately 9:40 on February 22, 1921. As he started to circle from the field which is the usual procedure, he failed to bank his ship, which resulted in a skid. (Witness explains) In order to sustain flight the relative velocity between the wing section and the air must be maintained at the normal flying speed of the ship. Failure to maintain speed will result in a stall which is usually followed by a tail spin. A tail spin at the altitude which Mr. Lewis was flying (500 ft) will result in the plane striking the ground.
The plane and engine was thoroughly tested on the ground before it was turned over to Captain Lewis. Captain Lewis also tried out his engine before taking off. I personally inspected the ship and will vouch for its condition.
Q. Did Captain Lewis have the experience to make successful flights?.
A. Captain Lewis was taught to fly in 1916 and has had, according to his log book approximately 500 air hours, which should make him thoroughly capable as a pilot.
However, his experience with the mail service, has not been exceptionally meritorious Lewis, resising (sic) at 6356 Greenwood Ave., Chicago, Ill. Regarding his general habits, he was considered a very quiet and unobtrusive man and was particularly interested in theology. He was not addicted to the use of intoxicating liquor or tobacco. His relations with the men of the field have been entirely of a friendly nature, and he was more or less quiet and kept to himself and he tended strictly to business and there was no one on the field who had a grude (sic) against him that might be considered of a personal nature.
(signed) E. M. BARBER This Coroner's jury was the sum total of the aircraft accident investigation. Only one witness was called, no other witnesses were interviewed, and there was no independent analysis of the crash site to determine airframe, engine, or flight control issues that might have contributed to the accident. In a letter to the Regional Superintendent in Reno, Barber explained in more detail his version of the accident. He stated that the pilot Blanchfield who had ferried ship No. 67 to Elko reported that "the ship ran well and….The ship is rather loggy and heavy on the controls" (p. 1). The maintenance crew checked the ship over, put in warm oil and warm water and started the engine. They warmed the engine, checked the switches, and shut the engine down until they saw Lewis approach. They then started the engine again and others loaded the mail from Lewis' ship to this one. Lewis climbed aboard then opened the throttle, tried both switches, and signaled to pull the blocks. He then took off down the field, (west) and flew in a straight course for a distance (estimated) of 1 ½ miles rising to an altitude of 500 ft. He then went into his first turn, turning south, leveling slightly and continued his turn toward the east.
In turning, it is the opinion of all witnesses including the following men: Geo.
Meredith, Chief Mechanic, Don. C. McCormick and Carl Hamilton radio operator that
Lewis did not bank his ship sufficiently. In other words, he attempted to execute a flat turn. The ship lost speed instantly, the nose dropped and went into a power spin with the nose pointed almost vertically. The ship struck directly on its nose tearing the engine and gasoline tanks loose.
Examination of the plane showed the following things. Both switches were on.
The throttle was about ¾ open however the rod was bent and it is probable that it was not in that position when the plane struck (Barber, pp. 1, 2).
Barber, as the field manager, was responsible for the airworthiness of the airplane therefore his testimony could be viewed as self-serving. The other witnesses cited in Barber's letter were maintenance technicians who prepared the airplane; they were not pilots. Perhaps they were qualified to judge Lewis' piloting actions and perhaps not. Except for the ferry pilot
Blanchfield's statement that the airplane was "loggy and heavy on the controls", there was no statement from a pilot. Blanchfield's statement brings up the notion that the airplane may have had a flight control problem, but this was not explored further. Rather, by both his testimony and his letter, Barber placed the blame directly on Lewis. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to examine Lewis' background.
The Pilot
He In Barber's testimony before the Coroner's jury, when referring to Lewis' capabilities as a pilot stated that, "his experience with the mail service, has not been exceptionally meritorious from a standpoint of accurate flying. He has slightly crashed several planes several times during his flying for the mail service which occupies the last two and one-half months" (Doughty, 1921, p. 2) . This statement implies two points: (1) Lewis was not a proficient pilot and (2) slightly crashing several panes in two and half months is atypical. Both of these points can be challenged with data. anyone raising an eyebrow at headquarters. In looking at the data, it appears (not conclusive) that Lewis had three, one each on January 10th, 12th and 22nd. To the extent that forced landings can be equated to slightly crashing an airplane, it is easy to conclude that when Barber inferred that Lewis was somehow atypical of other airmail pilots, he was doing so without support from the data. To be fair, later in his testimony Barber said that Lewis was average but the damage was done; he had already pointed the damming finger at Lewis.
Interestingly, Lewis' information was not included in the March 25, 1920, Post Office document. By the time the report was published, Lewis had suffered the fatal accident and there was no column for "Pilot Fatalities" in the document. Other documents of the period however did address pilot fatalities. Over the 1920-21 period, 17 airmail pilots lost their lives (Air Mail Service., Statistics, 1918 Statistics, -1928 . Given that the March 20, 1920, report showing 20 pilots in airmail service, the loss represents an attrition of 85% over the two year period.
Of those seventeen pilots who lost their lives, a study of the records yields the following causal statistics: four of the accidents were due to weather problems, four to mechanical issues, six to pilot error, and two unknown. These causal factors were not assigned by the Post Office authorities at the time of the accidents but were determined by the author by examining each of the brief reports . These accidents which are in the table that follows, were arranged by author-assigned event number, date, causal factor (P-Pilot, M-Mechanical, W-Weather, U-Unknown), and event description (Sutherin, 1925): 4 takeoff, yet the coroner's report states that the aircraft was approximately 500 feet. It would have been more understandable had the accident occurred on takeoff, but it did not. The pilot had climbed the DH-4 to 500 feet had made one turn of approximately 90 degrees and was attempting to make another 90-degree turn when the airplane departed from controlled flight.
How likely is it that a pilot stalls the aircraft after climbing to 500 feet, making one turn and starting another?
Comparing Modern Accident Data
To answer this question, modern aircraft accident data were examined. Two sets of data were studied: 1998 studied: and 2001 studied: (NTSB, 2012 . These years were chosen based upon the ease of accessibility of information. The data which were examined were of general aviation (GA) accidents in each of the two years. It was reasoned that modern GA aircraft matched more closely with the DH-4 than a modern-day, large commercial aircraft used to deliver the mail.
There were 1,929 GA accidents in 1998 and 1,749 in 2001. The files for each of the year sets were each sorted by the following parameters: VMC only; single engine only; airplane only (e.g., no balloons, helicopters); no amateur-built airplanes; only those accidents that occurred on takeoff-initial climb, climb, or climb to cruise; and finally those in which the first occurrence was loss of control. Once the sort factors were applied, the 1998 group produced 52 accidents and the 2001 group produced 36. The accident narrative for each of these 88 accidents was closely examined to determine similarities to the Lewis accident of 1921. This yielded one accident in each year group for further analysis. After some discussion with staff in the NTSB, the accident reports for these two accidents were added to the docket which then enabled the researcher to have access to the information (NTSB, 2012 Docket).
Of these two accidents, one was the result of improper aircraft configuration for takeoff on a Cessna 172 (pitot heat was on and flaps set at ¾ down). The airplane stalled at about 200 feet. The second aircraft was a PT-19 which stalled shortly after takeoff because the pilot failed to maintain proper airspeed. While both of these accidents appeared similar to the Lewis accident, in fact, upon close examination, neither was similar. Neither reached 500 feet, and neither stalled while trying to make a departure turn. The upshot of this analysis is that out of 3,678 accidents over a two-year, non-consecutive period, there were no accidents that were similar to the Lewis accident. A conclusion that one can draw is that the accident as described 
Student Investigation
To attempt to accomplish an accident investigation that should have occurred in 1921, a student group in an undergraduate college class in aircraft accident investigation was asked to conduct a mock aircraft accident investigation of the Lewis accident. They were provided all of the documents and material contained in the bibliography of this paper. Many of these documents were scanned from records in the National Archives and Records Administration, Washington D.C., the U. S. Postal Museum in Washington D.C., the National Air and Space Museum, Steven F. Udvar-Hazy Center in Washington Dulles, and the National Personnel Records Center, St. Louis, MO. The student investigation team produced the following findings (Garver et. al, 2012, p. 14) 5 :
• The aircraft was structurally not safe for flight operations.
• It was likely that no proper instrumentation was available in the cockpits of the aircraft in use.
• Given the information available, it is nearly impossible to assess the performance of the aircraft's structure and restraint systems in terms of protecting the occupants.
• Based on calculations using the available information and assumptions, the horizontal deceleration was likely at, or just slightly below, the lethal threshold.
However, the vertical deceleration was likely over 100 times the acceptable human tolerance. Therefore, this accident can clearly be considered non-survivable.
• Lack of information makes it difficult to assess environmental and post-crash factors.
However, given the magnitude of the declarative forces, it is extremely unlikely that the pilot was not killed instantly, rendering any environmental and post-crash factors irrelevant.
• No performance limitations were specified for the airplane by the Federal Airmail Service (FAS).
• No proper documentation was kept until the close of the financial year 1922.
5 A copy of the complete student accident investigation report and the archival documents shown on the references page in this paper can be accessed at the following google docs location: https://docs.google.com/folder/d/0BxDpepR869cbX3hiN3FqYVkyMjg/edit?usp=sharing
• Pilots flew to airports they had never been before. These flights typically occurred without any proper preparation or guidance.
• Even though flying at low altitude involved high risk, it was considered a normal and necessary procedure.
• The reported radiator leak was considered normal.
• The culture present within the FAS at the time of the accident was not conducive to the safe operation of any flight.
• Complaints from airmen in the FAS indicated that the aircraft were poor in maneuvering and had a tendency to enter a "tail spin" once an aerodynamic stall occurs.
The student team also determined that the probable cause of the Lewis accident was as follows 
The Dignity of an Investigation
The purpose of an aircraft accident investigation at its core is to determine the truth of what happened so that the real problems relating to the accident are solved with real solutions. But an accident investigation is more than that. It accords the parties involved in the accident the solemnity of a fair examination of the facts and a thoughtful, respectful determination of the causes. Until now airmail pilot Captain William E. Lewis had not been provided the dignity of an accident investigation. It is hoped that this report fulfills that basic obligation of the aviation community.
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